





























Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Bressanelli, E., Chelotti, N., & Lehmann, W. (2019). Negotiating Brexit: the European Parliament between
participation and influence. Journal of European Integration, 41(3), 347-363.
https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2019.1599372
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 02. Feb. 2021
1 
 
Negotiating Brexit:  
the European Parliament between Participation and Influence 
 
Abstract 
Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon gives the European Parliament (EP) the power to consent on 
the terms of the withdrawal agreement between the exiting state and the EU. As Brexit is the 
first case where art. 50 has been invoked, the role of the EP in such a procedure is uncharted 
territory. This article assesses to what extent the EP has contributed to the Brexit negotiations 
until November 2018. Drawing on official documentation and thirteen original interviews with 
EU policy-makers, it maps the Parliament’s organisational adaptation to prepare itself for the 
challenge. Through its steering group and coordinator, and by carefully issuing resolutions, the 
EP has managed to become a ‘quasi-negotiator’. More difficult to detect is the EP’s actual 
influence, as its preferences were closely aligned to those of the other EU institutions. Overall, 
the EP had a selective attention in the process, primarily focusing on citizens’ rights. 
 










Brexit is an unprecedented event for the European Union (EU). With the success of the ‘Leave’ 
option in the British referendum in June 2016, the EU – and, not dissimilarly, the UK – have 
entered uncharted territory. Art. 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon, which delineates the procedure of 
withdrawal, has never been previously invoked. This procedure is particularly scant for the 
European Parliament (EP), whose role is only to provide its consent to the withdrawal 
agreement between the EU and the departing Member State.  
As the consent procedure is used by the EP, among other things, for the approval of 
international trade and association agreements, it is tempting to look at the past use of this 
procedure to better understand the role of the EP in the Brexit negotiations. For instance, the 
EP has already shown that its consent cannot be taken for granted, voting down the EU-US 
agreement on bank data transfers and rejecting the anti-counterfeiting trade agreement. On the 
other hand, however, the procedure of withdrawal is more complex and the separation of a 
Member State from the EU more ‘dramatic’ than the negotiation of an international agreement. 
This article assesses the role of the EP in the process of withdrawal of the UK from the EU, 
from the immediate aftermath of the referendum in June 2016 to the Brexit negotiations up to 
November 2018, when the Brexit withdrawal agreement and the political declaration were 
endorsed by the 27 members of the EU and by the UK government. We argue that these 
negotiations pose a dual challenge for the EP – in the context of, ça va sans dire, a much bigger 
challenge for the EU. Institutionally, the EP is formally involved only towards the end of the 
process and unlikely to withhold its consent to the withdrawal agreement at that final stage. 
The EP would prefer almost any type of agreement to a no-deal scenario. In addition, the 
members of the Parliament (MEPs) would hardly wish to be seen as those standing in the way 
of such a significant and complex deal. Substantively, as the EP is not formally negotiating the 
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withdrawal treaty, its input may only reach the negotiators’ table in a round-about and indirect 
way.  
Yet, as previous research has demonstrated, the EP hardly misses a chance to strengthen its 
institutional role (Rittberger 2005; Héritier et al. 2015). Brexit – and, more precisely, the vague 
provisions of art. 50 TEU – present an opportunity for the EP to fill the gaps in such ‘incomplete 
contracts’ (e.g. Farrell & Héritier 2007) and acquire a more prominent role during the 
negotiation process, thus becoming a ‘quasi-negotiator’ standing on the side of the European 
Commission and the member states. At the same time, we are wary of the capacity and 
willingness of the EP to translate its enhanced institutional role into policy influence. While 
the EP’s empowerment tends to have a moderating effect on its behaviour in general (Ripoll-
Servent 2014; Paper 4), this is even more so when the negotiations tackle an “existential crisis” 
of the Union (Bressanelli & Chelotti 2016; 2018). This is not to say that the EP does not seek 
to influence the negotiations but, rather, that its interests and priorities might be reconsidered 
and softened if they risk undermining the general interest of the EU. 
Empirically, this article focuses first on the organisational adaptation of the EP to be a player 
in the Brexit process. It then evaluates its institutional involvement in the Brexit negotiations, 
and traces its influence in the key negotiation dossiers from the first phase up to November 
2018. We rely on thirteen original interviews (see the Appendix for details) with key policy-
makers in the EP and other EU institutions, and triangulate this information with official 
documentation, press excerpts and statements by the key players. 
By analysing in-depth the process of withdrawal of the UK from the EU, this article shows the 
effectiveness of the EP in strengthening its institutional role using the extant rules to its own 
advantage. Brexit is therefore part and parcel of a longer story of institutional empowerment 
of the EU’s only directly elected institution (e.g. Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood 2017). More 
difficult is to assess the actual policy influence of the Parliament. The preferences of the various 
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EU institutions were very similar in the whole period under consideration. On the whole, the 
EP mostly focused on one specific set of Brexit issues (i.e., citizens’ rights), while appearing 
more reactive on the other negotiating items. 
 
Some lessons from other consent precedents 
The consent (formerly assent) procedure requires the EP’s consent to a proposed act, in the 
case of Art. 50 TEU by a single vote with the majority of votes cast.i Contrary to the ordinary 
legislative procedure, the EP cannot amend a proposed act but without its consent the act cannot 
be adopted. Among the many legal bases for legislative and other policies specified in the 
treaties there are only relatively few (25) that are subject to the consent of the EP, some of them 
legislative, others not.ii These articles concern domains where citizens’ individual rights, the 
Parliament’s own institutional prerogatives or the constitutional and budgetary foundations of 
the EU are at stake. Numerically and politically, association and other agreements with third 
countries dominate the application of the consent procedure since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty. Among the approximately 120 consent procedures that were henceforth voted 
in plenary, about 85% concerned different types of these agreements (association agreements, 
trade agreements, partnership agreements, accession to multi-lateral conventions and others).  
The Lisbon Treaty thus had the double effect of introducing the possibility for a Member State 
to withdraw from the Union and of attributing a new institutional role to the EP in the negoti-
ation of international agreements. The final withdrawal agreement with the UK is a special 
example of such an agreement. A brief look at a few selected consent procedures may help us 
to understand the calculations that the Parliament may apply throughout the Brexit 
negotiations. The three cases below – where the EP used, or threatened to use, its veto power 
– vary in process and outcome, largely due to the time span elapsed and the experiences made 
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by the MEPs since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. They all provide some insight into 
the role of the Parliament in the consent procedure and, possibly, into the Brexit negotiations 
(cf. Eckes 2014). 
Case 1: Personal Name Record (PNR) Agreements. For a long time, access to and transfer of 
passenger name records (PNRs) fell under the purview of the 1995 EU Directive on data 
protection, replaced on 25 May 2018 by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). In 
principle, PNRs may only be transferred to countries with data protection laws guaranteeing 
an equivalent level of protection. From May 2004 to February 2012 three PNR agreements 
were signed and ratified by the US and the EU. Concerns were regularly expressed by activists 
and parliamentarians about the different uses the US government might make of EU citizens’ 
personal data. After Lisbon, in April 2012, the third PNR agreement was adopted by the EP, 
when stronger provisions to protect PNR data, including a watchdog role for Europol and 
Eurojust, were included. 
However, the draft of a fourth PNR agreement was roundly rejected by the Committee on Civil 
Liberties (LIBE) in 2013 for its lack of proportionality and violation of fundamental rights. 
After the 2015 Paris attacks, the proposal resurfaced with the support of the European Council, 
and first the LIBE Committee, then the plenary in April 2016 gave its consent to the directive. 
In the long PNR story, the EP acted under varying constraints. Not only there was a substantial 
pre-Lisbon history of previous agreements, establishing practices and experiences; it was also 
feared that bilateral agreements between the US and some Member States could be signed after 
a rejection of the agreement, leading to national rather than common European solutions. 
Perhaps more significantly, the need to effectively tackle international terrorism put pressure 




Case 2: Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) agreement. According to the European 
Commission “the TFTP has […] helped detect terrorist plots and trace their authors. An EU-
US Agreement on the exchange of financial information ensures protection of EU citizens’ 
privacy” (European Commission, 2018). Towards the final phase of the TFTP negotiations it 
became evident that a complete data export from the Belgium-based SWIFT system was 
envisaged. Concerns about the protection of European citizens’ personal data became virulent. 
This led the Parliament to reject the agreement, on 11 February 2010, by 378 to 196 votes, 
showing a rather clear cleavage along party lines. The Commission had to negotiate a new 
treaty for the US to be able to continue to access the SWIFT database. It thus introduced a new 
proposal with strengthened safeguards. Several observers noted that the modifications were 
only nominal, and that the Parliament changed position because it had demonstrated the will to 
make use of its new powers. The EP gave its support to the agreement only once its “right to 
be involved” was recognised (Ripoll Servent 2014; Meissner 2016; Monar 2010).  
Case 3: Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). ACTA was signed in 2011/12 by 9 
countries, the EU and 22 of its Member States. Its purpose was to define international standards 
for intellectual property rights enforcement. This included combating counterfeit goods, 
copyright infringement on the Internet and guidelines for protecting generic medicines. 
Opposition to ACTA in the EP was first fuelled by anger aroused by the Commission’s lack of 
transparency in its communications about the progress and content of negotiations (Crespy and 
Parks 2017).  
Following the recommendation of the five committees that had already voted against the treaty 
and ignoring calls by the Conservative groups to postpone the vote pending the opinion of the 
Court of Justice of the EU on its compatibility with EU law, a large majority of MEPs (478) 
rejected the agreement on 4 July 2012. Led by vocal interest associations, public opinion 
perceived ACTA as a symbol of secretive trade diplomacy controlled by economic interests. 
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MEPs were intensively lobbied by constituents and civil society (Dür and Mateo 2014), which 
led to a clear majority against ACTA at both the committee and plenary level. ACTA became 
the prime example of Parliament’s role as a public arena taking into account citizens’ and 
activists’ concerns.  
As a result of these inter-institutional struggles over PNR, TFTP and ACTA, the EP came to 
scrutinize on a regular basis the state of play of later negotiations, e.g. the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA). MEPs notably criticised the lack of transparency of the Commission and the Council 
during these negotiations. 
These cases illuminate some important factors that influence Parliament’s position-taking in 
consent procedures. Overall, the Parliament showed a significant degree of responsibility and 
pragmatism. While it voted no at some intermediate steps (PNR agreement) only in one case 
(ACTA) it provoked the complete abandonment of a fully negotiated agreement. The EP seems 
to hesitate on using the “nuclear option” of refusing consent. Early after Lisbon, it was 
important to convince the other players of its new-won powers. Seeing itself as a democratic 
arena, the EP reacted to strong public activism and defended citizens’ rights, notably against 
practices not well aligned with EU fundamental rights. Finally, it insisted on opening 
international negotiations to democratic scrutiny. 
As for Brexit, unless the negotiation outcome has profound faults in the eyes of the EP’s 
mainstream groups, the EP is unlikely to block the withdrawal agreement. On the one hand, if 
negotiations fail the divorce between the EU and the UK will be extremely severe. A border 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland would be established; the UK might not 
pay its withdrawal bill; possibly, the rights of EU citizens in the UK (and UK citizens in the 
EU) will not be protected – or fewer guarantees might be granted. In addition, free from any 
association with the EU, the UK might diverge from EU rules and standards in numerous fields 
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including state aid, environment, taxation, etc. – which is what the EP wants to avoid (e.g., 
European Parliament 2018: 3-4; 10). Even a Brexit deal that ignores or violates several (many?) 
of the EP’s demands is closer to the EP’s preferences than the alternative (a no-deal). 
Rationally, the EP has strong incentives to accept almost any type of deal. 
Furthermore, when stakes are high and crises might materialise (as, arguably, in the case of 
Brexit), the EP tends to behave responsibly (Bressanelli and Chelotti 2018). Considering the 
wider good of the EU, MEPs do not insist on many of their requests and often prefer not to take 
action. In such circumstances, they do not want to be seen as the actors that block momentous 
agreements or bring about negative consequences for the EU. 
 
The strategies of the EP to ‘matter’ in the Brexit process 
The consent vote arrives at the very end of the negotiating process, when the content of the 
Brexit agreement has already been decided by the Commission Task Force and the UK 
government. At that point, there is little that the EP can do to change the package, as it is left 
with a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ option. If the EP wants to make sure that its preferences are counted, 
it has to be involved in the actual negotiations and participate in the definition of the positions. 
It is at the negotiating stage, and not at the end of the process, that – as Sir Ivan Rogers, former 
British Ambassador to the EU, told the Commons Treasury Select Committee – the EP will 
likely have more leverage (Horten 2017). 
As Brexit is the first exit in the EU’s history, it is not surprising that neither interinstitutional 
agreements nor informal rules on the modalities of negotiating a country’s withdrawal exist. In 
these circumstances, we know that the EP has been traditionally very successful in using 
incomplete contracts to increase its institutional power (Farrell and Héritier 2007; Rasmussen 
and Toshkov 2011). Through a series of micropolitical struggles (Wiesner 2018) – which 
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includes using time pressure, windows of opportunity, democratic legitimacy and symbolic 
power (Rittberger 2005) or allying with the Commission – the EP has been able to interpret 
ambiguous rules or new situations to its advantage. 
Crucially, the EP has often done so by skilfully linking different arenas: by delaying or 
withholding its consent in areas where it had a strong institutional basis, it was able to acquire 
new competences in other policy-making domains (Héritier et al. 2015; Paper 2). In the case 
of the Brexit negotiations, the EP does not have to look very far to find the right arena-linkage. 
It can use its power of consent as a tool to obtain a voice throughout the entire process and 
become fully – if not formally – involved in the negotiations or, as we show in this article, a 
‘quasi-negotiator’. This is what the EP has done, albeit to different extents, in EU trade policy. 
The Lisbon treaty gave the EP the obligation to ratify international trade deals. Unlike the 
withdrawal agreement and article 50, in the case of trade policy the EP has been granted the 
right of being “immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure” (art. 218(10) 
TFEU). Through these powers (of consent and of full information), the EP managed to upgrade 
its institutional position – albeit certainly not being on equal footing with the Council. In any 
event, the Parliament became involved in all phases of trade negotiations while also influencing 
the relative agenda and content (Roederer-Rynning and Kallestrup 2017; Van den Putte et al. 
2014). 
In the case of Brexit, we aim to evaluate to what extent the EP has been successful in increasing 
its institutional powers – whether it has remained a veto player at the end of the game or has 
developed the ability to shape the negotiations throughout. Analytically, we can identify three 
areas of further EP empowerment. First, we can assess the access of the EP to the information 
produced and/or acquired by the Commission and the Council. The Brexit negotiations are 
extremely transparent, but the negotiating teams possess restricted information unavailable to 
the public. Here, we can examine the nature of the dialogue between the Commission and the 
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EP. For instance, unlike other trade negotiations, in the case of TTIP the EP was kept informed 
before and after each round of talks (Van den Putte et al. 2014). The timing of the consultation 
is also important. In trade policy, it is not infrequent that the Council shares documents with 
the EP with significant delays (Abazi and Adriaensen 2017). 
Second, the EP might not only be kept informed, but also be involved in the various stages of 
the Brexit process (the ‘quasi-negotiator’ scenario). The EP would participate when the 
European Council negotiates its guidelines, the Commission drafts the Council directives and 
the Council finalises them. In addition, at crucial moments of the negotiations, the EP would 
be admitted to the decision-making rooms. In the negotiations that led to the SWIFT 
Agreement, the EP was included by the Commission during the agenda-setting stage, and by 
the Council Presidency in the very last rounds of negotiations. 
Being informed of the proceedings and/or participating in the negotiations do not automatically 
translate into real impact. The third aspect concerns the ability of the EP to shape the content 
and direction of the Brexit talks in tangible and significant ways. The EP has several 
instruments at its disposal to influence the mandate and its evolutions – e.g., resolutions, 
committees’ opinions, hearings, parliamentary questions, etc. (cf. Roederer-Rynning and 
Kallestrup 2017: 813). In particular, EP resolutions can be used as de facto mandates, outlining 
the Parliament’s red lines which have to be respected if its consent has to be obtained. 
Applying this analytical grid, three scenarios on the influence of the EP in the Brexit 
negotiations can be presented. The first one posits that the EP is satisfied of being informed 
and involved and does not strive to shape the policy content of the negotiations. The process 
of ‘institutional patriotism’ (Priestley 2008) – in which the EP has been strengthening its 
participation in EU decision making processes – has continued successfully and the EP does 
not aim any further. Indeed, in many occasions the fights that the EP has conducted on 
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legislation “have not been about the content of politics but about ensuring that certain 
institutional rights are expected or maybe even expanded” (Rasmussen and Toshkov 2011: 72). 
In a second scenario, the EP leaves its mark on the substance of the negotiations but focuses 
on a restricted number of issues. On the one hand, the Brexit negotiations cover a vast range of 
issues and sub-issues and the EP will have to prioritise. The EP is a politically and 
bureaucratically fragmented actor, the resources and staff at its disposal are relatively scarce 
and often difficult to mobilise in a coherent fashion to pursue a comprehensive negotiating 
agenda. As a result, the EP would attempt to intervene in the negotiations to promote a 
(relatively small) set of priorities. In the case of the EU-South Korea trade deal, for instance, 
the EP concentrated on changing a few specific clauses and asked the Commission to re-
negotiate them (Elsig and Dupont 2012). On the other hand, the EP may prioritise those 
political issues where it clearly sees its democratic mandate as the representative of EU citizens 
as it did, for instance, when it reacted to the demands of civil society in the ACTA negotiations.  
The third scenario is that the EP manages to exert the main impact on the Brexit negotiations 
among EU actors. Here, the Parliament presents a fully-fledged position on Brexit – rather 
detailed on the various items under negotiation – which ultimately informs the EU objectives 
and instructions. In case of different preferences between the EP and the Commission and/or 
member states, the final EU position would reflect the Parliament’s priorities. If the preferences 
are instead homogeneous, it becomes more difficult to tease out the specific influence of the 
EP from that of the Commission and/or Council.  
Finally, the analysis so far has treated the EP as a relatively independent actor. It might be that, 
in the Brexit negotiations, the Parliament, the Commission and/or Council engage in strategic 
interactions, which might take different forms. These institutions might collaborate and provide 
collective leadership to the EU. They would jointly construct and update the EU positions 
throughout the various stages of the negotiations – working in different formats and fulfilling 
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both formal and informal tasks (Nielsen and Smeets 2018). Otherwise, it might be that the EP’s 
policy preferences are strategically used by the Commission in the course of the negotiations. 
The empowerment of the EP would assist the EU negotiating team in extracting more 
concessions from the UK. 
 
The organisational adaptation of the Parliament 
 
First steps after the referendum 
Having learnt the result of the British referendum the majority groups of the EP set out to define 
their political priorities. Implementing them required a clear-headed approach to the 
negotiations due to begin after the formal notification by the British government. A major 
problem facing the Parliament, more so than is the case with the Commission or the Council, 
were the two political groups supporting Brexit (Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy – 
EFDD - and Europe of Nations and Freedom - ENF). Whereas the European Council and the 
Commission were able to develop their Brexit policy without British participation, the political 
problem of dealing with British MEPs was more delicate, as they represent not only British 
citizens but also other EU citizens who voted in the UK. Soon after the Brexit referendum, an 
informal cross-party group of British MEPs was formed, with members mainly coming from 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats but including a few Conservative MEPs in favour of 
Remain. The group met about once a month, usually during the plenary part-session in 
Strasbourg, until autumn 2018. Its impact on Parliament’s strategy during the Brexit 
negotiation was not clearly visible. iii 
The day after the referendum, EP President Martin Schulz suggested that Parliament’s 
customary approach, the establishment of a Special Committee, would be too slow and 
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inappropriate (Conference of Presidents 2016a; Interview#10). Most EP committee work is 
public. Parliament’s intention to weigh in as a serious actor in the withdrawal negotiation would 
have been put at risk: the two other institutions would then need to filter their exchange of 
information with the EP to keep negotiating positions from public contention. 
Consequently, Parliament’s Brexit related work was to be supervised at the highest political 
level, with novel procedural arrangements. Although there were a few antecedents for such 
institutional innovation (e.g. an ad-hoc group established by the EP President in 2015 to 
coordinate committees’ positions on the TTIP agreement), the set-up chosen for the Brexit 
process was inventive in several ways. The President of the Parliament and the Conference of 
Presidents (CoP) seized overall responsibility, with due involvement of the Conference of 
Committee Chairs, the Bureau, the groups and the committees. However, these latter 
parliamentary bodies were not to be involved in the direct observation of negotiations. 
Administrative support for the Brexit process was to be provided by the Deputy Secretary 
General and hence by DG Presidency staff, headed by the Director for Legislative Coordination 
and Inter-institutional Affairs (Conference of Presidents 2016b; 2016c). 
Long before the UK notification letter was sent on 29 March 2017, the EP began to prepare for 
the drafting of a first resolution pointing out its priorities and red lines. The draft resolution 
was to be submitted to the plenary by the CoP, considering expertise provided by the 
committees. On 8 September 2016, the CoP decided to appoint Guy Verhofstadt, President of 
the ALDE group, Brexit coordinator “at the level of the Conference of Presidents”, once more 
underlining the CoP’s direct responsibility for steering Parliament’s involvement in the 
negotiation. Among the reasons for choosing Verhofstadt, a choice initiated and strongly 
supported by President Schulz, were his long experience as former member of the European 
Council and, as MEP, in inter-institutional negotiations such as those on the Inter-Institutional 
Agreement on Better Law Making (Interview#4). 
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The Brexit coordinator was requested to cooperate closely with the chair of the AFCO 
committee, Danuta Hübner, as the committee responsible for preparing Parliament’s final vote 
on the withdrawal agreement. Beyond that, Verhofstadt’s tasks included information exchange 
and coordination between the above-mentioned governing bodies, the committees and, last but 
not least, the Commission’s Art. 50 Task Force and the Council’s ad hoc Working Party on 
Art. 50. Besides, the Brexit coordinator was frequently requested to visit Member State capitals 
or to receive ministers and other key players of the Brexit process. On many occasions, Guy 
Verhofstadt and Michel Barnier appeared jointly before Parliament bodies. 
 
Responding to the UK’s notification 
After the arrival of the UK government’s formal notification letter, and in view of the 
experience made during the initial post-referendum stage (for instance in the informal drafting 
team preparing Parliament’s first Brexit resolution), the CoP agreed, on 6 April 2017, the 
President’s proposal to establish a Brexit Steering Group (BSG), to be chaired by Guy 
Verhofstadt and comprising the AFCO chair and four members representing the European 
People’s Party (Elmar Brok), the Socialists and Democrats (Roberto Gualtieri), the Greens 
(Philippe Lamberts) and the European United Left (Gabriele Zimmer).iv Like its informal 
predecessor, the BSG is supported by the Deputy Secretary General, the Director for 
Legislative Coordination and Inter-institutional Affairs and DG Presidency staff. 
In order to guarantee the coherence of Parliament’s stance, it was decided to suspend any 
committee missions to the UK (Conference of Presidents 2017, Bureau 2017a). Moreover, a 
new approach was taken to collect and evaluate committees’ expertise in drafting the Brexit-
related resolutions. Instead of going through the traditional opinion-giving and lead committee 
process, including reiterated votes on various amendments, an informal consultation was 
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organised, directed by the support unit for the BSG. In addition, committee Chairs and 
coordinators took part in selected meetings of the BSG, depending on the matter discussed.v In 
most meetings, committees dealt with the impact of the current state of affairs of the Brexit 
negotiation on the policies under their remit. However, the EP leadership clearly wielded 
control on sectoral demands that might be detrimental for the institution’s overarching strategy. 
 
Beyond the BSG 
Negotiating Brexit raised numerous administrative and budgetary problems. For example, in 
an early stage of the Brexit process concerns were expressed in the Bureau about the role and 
mandate of British MEPs during the rest of the 2014-2019 term and about the status of British 
EU officials and other agents (i.e. group officials, parliamentary assistants). Specific questions 
related to the Brexit impact on the 2019 budget – such as the viability and actuarial balance of 
Members` voluntary pension fund, the preservation of English as an official language, or the 
future of the EP Information Office in London – were discussed in the Bureau (Bureau 2017b; 
2017c). 
Between the end of June 2016 and November 2018 the EP’s governing bodies, the CoP, the 
Conference of Committee Chairs, and the Bureau had Brexit on their agenda on a regular basis; 
during active periods of negotiation Brexit became a standard agenda item. All in all, there 
were around 70 meetings discussing Brexit in different degrees of intensity and detail. In 
addition, Brexit was on the agenda of AFCO about every other meeting from autumn 2016 
onwards, often in the presence of Guy Verhofstadt, who reported on the current state of the 
negotiations. Many other committees have organised hearings on the impact of Brexit on their 
respective policies and on the analysis of different scenarios between hard, soft and in-between 
variants of Brexit. Often these hearings addressed Parliament’s priority issues, such as the 
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hearing jointly organised on 11 May 2017 by four committees (LIBE, PETI, EMPL and AFCO) 
on “the situation and rights of EU Citizens in the UK”. Up to now, around 120 research 
briefings and studies on Brexit were drawn up or commissioned by DG EPRS or in the Policy 
Departments (Interview#5). 
During the Brexit negotiation process, the Parliament has adopted four Brexit-related 
resolutions, which obtained large majorities of around 500 votes in favour (cf. Brusenbauch 
Meislova 2018).vi In addition to specific substantive points, the EP reiterated some general 
demands already made in earlier consent procedures, such as a maximum of transparency in 
the negotiations. The substance of the negotiations is what the next section finally focuses on 
– seeking to uncover firstly whether the EP managed to participate in the Brexit process, and 
secondly whether it has been an influential player both in the negotiation of the withdrawal 
agreement and the political declaration. 
 
The involvement and influence of the EP in the negotiating process 
If ‘power’ is an attribute that actors can use to shape policy outcomes, ‘influence’ is when 
power is put into effect (cf. Paper 1; see also Thomson 2011). Influence does not simply mean 
that a decision-making outcome matches the position of an actor. This may be ‘luck’ rather 
than influence. Influence requires the exercise of power vis-à-vis other actors and their will.  
As explained above, the formal role assigned to the EP by the Treaty of Lisbon would limit its 
presence to the very end of the negotiation process. Yet, the EP managed to get involved in the 
negotiations before art. 50 was triggered. This was not an obvious outcome. In mid-December 
2016, as the EU was getting ready to start the divorce process, the EP leadership voiced its 
concerns very loudly. Reacting to the Council conclusions, attributing a secondary role to the 
EP in the Brexit negotiations, the EP President Schulz warned that there would be “grave 
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consequences if the European Parliament is excluded” in a letter to the European Council 
President Tusk. In such circumstances, the EP would not consent and the outcome “would be 
the very hardest of Brexits” (Schulz 2016). Similar concerns were eloquently expressed by the 
Brexit coordinator, Guy Verhofstadt, addressing the representative of the Council Presidency 
in the EP plenary: 
 
What they are proposing is simply to say, ah, we go forward with the Brexit 
negotiations, but without the Parliament. We can invite sherpas, maybe, but 
that’s it. You are not aware that we have to approve these arrangements? OK, 
that’s already an enormous step forward, but I am going to tell you it’s time 
that you also involved Parliament from day one. Do you want that we open 
separate negotiations with the British authorities? (Verhofstadt 2016) 
 
The Conclusions of the informal European Council on 15 December 2016 attributed a scrutiny 
role to the EP. The latter had to be kept “closely and regularly informed” and the Presidency 
of the Council would exchange views with the EP before and after the meetings of the General 
Affairs Council. As it is normally the case, the Conclusions reaffirmed that the President of 
the EP would be invited to be heard at the beginning of each meeting of the European Council.  
After Schulz’s departure, the new EP President Antonio Tajani – whose election was made 
possible by a deal between his People’s Party and Verhofstadt’s ALDE – demanded again the 
full involvement of the EP in the negotiations. Eventually, the EP obtained reassurances from 
the Council that its sherpas could attend meetings with the Council sherpas and its 
representatives could be closely associated to the Commission in the negotiations. This was a 
significant step further for the EP, facilitated by the support of the European Commission. As 
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a senior administrator of the EP put it: “if the EP does not consent, the negotiations come to 
nothing. Barnier quickly understood that, and he cultivated the relationship with the EP” 
(Interview#10). 
The Commission (but also the Council) had a strategic incentive to fully involve the EP in the 
negotiations. At the end of the day “if you want to make sure that you have a positive result 
[…] you want to make sure that the EP has first of all no procedural complaints” (Interview#4). 
One more time, as it has often been the case in the history of the EP, with (the recognition of 
its) power came responsibility. While Schulz had threatened the EP’s veto had it been excluded 
from the negotiations, its involvement made it more moderate and cooperative. Despite claims 
that the Parliament was “ready to play the bad cop” and “complain about almost everything”,vii 
the analysis of the negotiations – up to November 2018 – tells a rather different story.  
The negotiations – and the role of the EP in them – can be analytically divided into two phases, 
mirroring the actual negotiating process. In a first stage, following the triggering of art. 50 at 
the end of March 2017 until the Joint report on progress in December 2017, the EU established 
that three key issues – the rights of the EU citizens, the UK financial contribution to the EU 
and the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic – had to be agreed before discussing 
any future EU-UK relationship. Here, the EP endorsed the approach chosen by the Council and 
the Commission, albeit emphasising once again that its “full involvement” in the negotiations 
was a “necessary precondition” for its consent (European Parliament 2017). 
In terms of substance, the behaviour of the EP during the first phase of the negotiations shows 
that the EP carefully and selectively chose what to focus on. The EP invested its resources on 
citizens’ rights, leaving the other two priority issues (the financial settlement and the Irish 
border) more to the side. As a senior administrator puts it: “we have not gone into finances. 
We have asked the budgetary control committee to scrutinize the arrangements. On Northern 
Ireland, we wait and see” (Interview#4). 
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Nonetheless, it is not easy to tease out the specific influence of the EP on citizens’ rights. 
Although the EP could afford to speak out more loudly than the Commission on specific 
sticking points where the negotiating parties had divergent perspectives, it is difficult to 
appreciate whether the outcome would have been any different had the EP not publicly 
endorsed a position.  
With Brexit perceived as a potentially ‘existential threat’ for the Union, both the three EU 
institutions and the major political groups inside the EP were willing to put aside somewhat 
minor divergencies to concentrate on the ‘big picture’. According to senior administrators in 
the EP directly dealing with the Brexit process, the cohesion of the EU was “very much not a 
coincidence” as the EU institutions were “constructing an agreement” (emphasis added) and 
“alignments are always searched and achieved [between the EU institutions]” before 
negotiating (Interviews#10, #13; also Interview#9). 
The Commission and the EP had a particularly close relationship. This is significantly 
confirmed by civil servants in the Council, surprised by the fact that “sometimes Verhofstadt 
even announced things which happened in the end and that Member States were not told that 
they were going to happen” (Interview#6, see also Interview#12). The Commission had been 
vocal about the (important) role of the EPviii and, on the issue of citizens’ rights, “could exploit” 
(Interview#6) the EP to give additional political clout to the EU negotiating positions. For 
instance, following the third round of negotiations in late August 2017, the Commission and 
the UK negotiators could not agree on about a third of the issues identified on citizens’ rights 
(European Commission 2017).ix The EP was keen to show its full support for the Commission. 
Playing the role of the EU citizens’ advocate – as well as that of the UK citizens resident in the 
EU – the EP further pushed for their rights in the negotiations (substantively, e.g. family 
reunion, and procedurally, e.g. on the application for ‘settled status’). Yet, the more radical 
stance of the EP was certainly not opposed by the Commission. As seen by a Council official, 
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“I don’t think that they [the EP and the Commission] diverge, really, in any kind of significant 
way. It might be just the nuance of it” (Interview#12).  
In the second phase of the negotiations, from January 2018 until the finalization of the 
agreement in November 2018, two intertwined issues were on the Brexit negotiations table: the 
withdrawal agreement (including the transition period) and the future EU-UK relationship. The 
EP continued to press hard on the issues of EU citizens’ rights, insisting that they should be 
maintained during the transition period after 29 March 2019. Additionally, the EP was the first 
institution to make very clear – already in its October (2017) resolution on the state of play of 
the negotiations – that there were only two options available for Northern Ireland: either its full 
membership in the EU, or the UK remaining part of the customs union (Interview#10). The EP 
gave visibility to the issue of the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland 
from the early days of the negotiations, endorsing a position which was later shared by the EU 
negotiators. As the negotiation efforts intensified during the autumn of 2018, the Parliament 
continuously reiterated the necessity of a backstop to avoid a ‘hard’ border between Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to secure its consent to the deal.x Once again, its position – 
backed by internal cross-party support – mirrored that of the other EU institutions, and their 
firm, joint commitment to avoid the re-appearance of a hard border. 
On the future relationship between the EU and the UK, the EP, in its March 2018 resolution, 
proposed an “association agreement”, modelled on those signed by the EU with third-countries 
willing to get closer to the Union (e.g. Ukraine). Its position differed from the one of the other 
EU institutions – as the Commission had signalled its preference for a Canada-like trade deal 
(given that the UK ruled out staying in the Single market), and the European Council 
Presidency reckoned that “unfortunately Brexit was about dissociation not association” 
(Brunsden 2018; cf. Interview#6). Yet, while at that stage the legal format of the future 
relationship differed in the eyes of the EU institutions, their substantive demands to the UK 
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were very similar. If the latter wanted high levels of access to the single market, it should have 
dropped several of its red-lines both in case of an association agreement (the EP’s favoured 
option) or in case of a Norway-style deal (as endorsed back then by the Commission/Council). 
Taking stock of the existing evidence, there are two aspects which stand out. First, while the 
EP has been outspoken on important issues (e.g. EU citizens’ rights), its position did not 
significantly differ from that of the other EU institutions. Its four resolutions on Brexit followed 
the Council (draft) negotiating guidelines or directives, or the Commission’s reports on the 
state of play. With a few exceptions (i.e. the association agreement), a comparison of the 
official documents of the EU institutions shows a strong commonality of content. 
Second, the selective focus of the EP on (mainly) EU citizens’ rights is likely to be at least 
partly explained by the type of organisational structure it set up to deal with Brexit (see, in 
detail, Section 4). Rather than having the Committees and their sectoral policy interests in the 
lead – the Committees “feel, and rightly so, that they were not in the front line” (Interview#10) 
– the BSG and its leadership eye the bigger picture and the more political issues: “if decision-
making was at the level of the Committees, it would be more fragmented, less consistent and 
more polarised” (Interview#13). Since the informal European Council at Salzburg of 19/20 
September 2018, the question of “preparedness” for a possible no-deal Brexit has become a 
key issue for the BSG and the other governing bodies of the EP, reinforcing the need for close 
coordination in order to adopt necessary fast-track legislation across different policy areas, 
including citizens´ rights. 
 
Conclusion 
The EP formal role in the Brexit negotiations is limited to its consent at the very end of the 
process. As this article has shown, consent has cast a backward shadow on the process, with 
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the EP using the vague provisions detailed in art. 50 to expand its powers throughout the 
negotiations. Institutionally, the EP was able not only to be informed regularly and thoroughly 
by the Commission; it managed to participate in the key decisions throughout the process and 
become a quasi-negotiator, with its informal involvement in the key stages of the Brexit 
process. Although previous international negotiations post-Lisbon provided some antecedents, 
the organisational set-up chosen by the EP to contribute effectively to Brexit has been quite 
unique. Through its steering group and its coordinator, and by issuing resolutions along the 
way, the EP has made itself heard throughout the Brexit process. Once again, the EP has been 
able to increase its formal powers and expand its institutional remit (Héritier et al. 2015; 
Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood 2017).  
As to whether the power of the EP has translated into influence, this article reaches a more 
careful conclusion. What emerges clearly from the interviews and the documentary evidence 
is that the EP has chosen its priorities carefully. Of the three scenarios delineated in section 3 
(lack of impact; selective attention; fully-fledged negotiating actor), the EP’s behaviour 
appears to fall within the second category. Building on its role as the representative of the EU 
citizens, the Parliament’s focus has been first and foremost on citizens’ rights. Other important 
issues in the divorce settlement – particularly the financial contribution of the UK, and to a 
lesser extent the Irish question – did not have the same salience for the EP. On these items, the 
EP seems to have followed the inputs and lead of the other EU institutions. The choice to have 
the Brexit Steering Group rather than the Committees at the forefront of the Brexit negotiations 
may have influenced the prioritisation of the more political dossiers.  
More generally, the EU institutions have all worked very closely together in the first two phases 
of the Brexit negotiations, and it is often difficult to disentangle their specific influence. The 
recognition of the EP’s role in the negotiation process has facilitated a constructive relationship 
between the three EU institutions. Additionally, the Commission looked very favourably at the 
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EP’s amendments, and could ‘use’ its democratically elected ally to extract more concessions 
from the UK, for instance, on some elements of citizens’ rights. The Brexit negotiations have 
shown that with the EP’s empowerment comes responsibility and a cooperative rather than 
confrontational attitude. 
Looking ahead, the EP has already signalled that it is ready to push for further institutional 
involvement in the scrutiny of the Brexit process. The withdrawal agreement establishes a Joint 
Committee (with EU and UK officials) having the task of handling the disputes arising from 
the implementation of the Brexit deal. The EP has called for the possibility to scrutinise this 
Joint committee, while the EU-27 ambassadors have ruled that out, by indicating that the 
demands “go beyond what is prescribed by the treaty”.xi One more time, the EP is pushing for 
an expansion of its institutional powers and, if the Brexit negotiations have taught us anything, 
some of its requests will be accepted. For the other EU institutions, this would be the safest 
assurance for having the EP on their own side and moderate its demands. 
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i Rule 82 of the EP’s Rules of Procedure 
ii See Corbett et al. (2016) and Ripoll Servent (2018) for an overview of the policies concerned. 
iii After the transmission of the UK letter opening the Art. 50 procedure nine British MEPs left the Parliament. 
They were either elected to the House of Commons (four) or appointed life peers (two). As it is not uncommon 
for MEPs from other member states to leave the EP after being elected to their national parliament (e.g., recently 
in the case of Germany, Sweden and France) it would be tenuous to assert that these British MEPs would otherwise 
have stayed in the EP. Just a few of them might have decided to quit for reasons indirectly related to Brexit, e.g. 
to start or maintain a professional career elsewhere. 
iv British MEP Richard Corbett had actively participated in the drafting of Parliament’s first Brexit resolution of 
5 April 2017. When the ad-hoc body formally became the Brexit Steering Group he was replaced by Roberto 
Gualtieri. Apparently, the S&D leadership felt that it would be difficult to have a British MEP in such a high-
profile position during negotiations on Brexit. 
v In what is called the “enlarged Brexit Steering Group format” 
vi These four resolutions are: the resolution on negotiations following the UK’s notification that it intends to 
withdraw from the EU (5 April 2017); the resolution on the state of play of negotiations with the UK (3 October 
2017); the resolution on the state of play of negotiations with the UK (13 December 2017); the resolution on the 
framework of the future EU-UK relationship (14 March 2018). 
vii Pedro Lopez de Pablo, EPP spokesman, quoted in Politico, 28 March 2017. 
viii See Michael Barnier, speaking after the third round of negotiations: “I suggest that nobody underestimates 
the role of the European Parliament”, quoted in Politico, 01 September 2017. 
ix Specifically, 21 issues over a total of 61. 
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x Cf. the conclusions of the BSG on 15th October 2018. The Conference of Presidents on 12th December 2018, 
further to the uncertainties in the approval of the deal at Westminster, reiterated: “without the backstop […] 
Parliament would not give its consent”. 
xi Quoted in Politico, 21 December 2018. 
